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Abstract We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.
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