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A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders · Study

WorkA Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders

Kira Goldner2016

Work2016

A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders

Kira Goldner · Anna R. Karlin

25 citations·0/0 files stored·Lecture notes in computer science

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Optimization and Search Problems

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References

1994Auctions vs. Negotiations 2014The sample complexity of revenue maximization 2012Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization 2012An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms 2017Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist 2014A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer 2010Revenue maximization with a single sample 2013On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items

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Year2016

Typeother

Published2016-01-01

VenueLecture notes in computer science

ISSN-L0302-9743

Languageen

Citations25

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

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doi10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_12

openalex_workW2559925558

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