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A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
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A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders (2016)A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Au…Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist (2017)Strong Duality for a Multiple…Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation (2016)Mechanism Design for Subaddit…A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design (2016)A duality based unified appro…Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity (2015)Simple Mechanisms for a Subad…On the Pseudo-Dimension of Nearly Optimal Auctions (2015)On the Pseudo-Dimension of Ne…The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)The sample complexity of reve…A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)A Simple and Approximately Op…Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design (2013)Understanding Incentives: Mec…On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items (2013)On revenue maximization for s…Mechanism design via optimal transport (2013)Mechanism design via optimal …Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization (2012)Optimal Multi-dimensional Mec…Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items (2012)Approximate Revenue Maximizat…Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (2012)Approximate revenue maximizat…An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms (2012)An algorithmic characterizati…Revenue maximization with a single sample (2010)Revenue maximization with a s…Auctions vs. Negotiations (1994)Auctions vs. NegotiationsTakeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Auctions and Bidding (1986)The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions (2003)Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance (2008)Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly (2007)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)The menu-size complexity of auctions (2013)Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (2017)Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality (2017)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Incentives in Teams (1973)Auctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap (2011)Revenue maximization with a single sample (2014)Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices (2015)Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting (2019)The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies (2020)Game theory: analysis of conflict (1992)Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes (1999)The Price of Anarchy in Auctions (2017)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency (1999)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)
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References

  • 1994Auctions vs. Negotiations229 cited
  • 2014The sample complexity of revenue maximization198 cited
  • 2012Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization195 cited
  • 2012An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms166 cited
  • 2017Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist164 cited
  • 2014A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer150 cited
  • 2010Revenue maximization with a single sample143 cited
  • 2013On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items130 cited
  • 2012Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items116 cited
  • 2016A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design103 cited
  • 2013Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design97 cited
  • 2015Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity94 cited
  • 2013Mechanism design via optimal transport94 cited
  • 2012Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items85 cited
  • 2015On the Pseudo-Dimension of Nearly Optimal Auctions82 cited
  • 2016

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Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation
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