SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties
16 references·2 citing·44 second hop
Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties (2017)Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verificat…A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach (2016)A Study in the Pragmatics of …Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification (2014)Optimal Allocation with Costl…Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions (2013)Awarding Price, Contract Perf…Optimal mechanism design and money burning (2008)Optimal mechanism design and …On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design (2006)On the Simple Economics of Ad…Hard evidence and mechanism design (2006)Hard evidence and mechanism d…Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (2005)Bidding with Securities: Auct…On Optimal Rules of Persuasion (2004)On Optimal Rules of PersuasionMechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency (2004)Mechanism Design with Interde…Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach (1991)Implementation of Reduced For…Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution (1989)Optimal Auditing, Insurance, …Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder (1987)Samurai Accountant: A Theory …Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design (1986)Partially Verifiable Informat…Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem (1985)Incentive-Compatible Debt Con…Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Optimal contracts and competi…Theoretical Economics (1968)Theoretical EconomicsRobust benchmark design (2021)Robust benchmark designMechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments (2020)Mechanism design with costly …Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game (1994)Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation (1999)Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly (2004)Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Corruption, extortion and evasion (1999)Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information (2010)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility (1979)A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm (1984)Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits (1989)Red tape and corruption (2003)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets (1989)Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships (1990)The role of capital in financial institutions (1995)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group (2007)Using Models to Persuade (2020)Theory of Value (1959)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt (1991)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Revenue maximization with a single sample (2010)Selling privacy at auction (2013)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Security Design with Investor Private Information (2007)Real Options Signaling Games with Applications to Corporate Finance (2011)Auctions with Contingent Payments (2016)Advertising as Information (1974)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Chapter 28 The Economic Analysis of Advertising (2007)Bayesian Persuasion (2011)Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition (2013)American Economic Review (2019)The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games (2008)Intentional Vagueness (2013)Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification3,201 cited
  • 1985Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem1,799 cited
  • 2006On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design633 cited
  • 1989Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution583 cited
  • 1987Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder334 cited
  • 1986Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design264 cited
  • 2005Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design208 cited
  • 1968Theoretical Economics201 cited
  • 2008Optimal mechanism design and money burning194 cited
  • 2004On Optimal Rules of Persuasion191 cited
  • 2013Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions176 cited
  • 1991Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach150 cited
  • 2004Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency141 cited
  • 2014Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification126 cited
  • 2016A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach107 cited
  • 2006

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Hard evidence and mechanism design
102 cited

Cited by

  • 2020Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments40 cited
  • 2021Robust benchmark design36 cited