Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates

Abstract

An extensive literature on venture capital has studied asymmetric information and agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs, examining how separating entrepreneurs from the investor can create frictions that might inhibit the funding of good projects.It has largely abstracted away from the fact that a startup typically does not have just one investor, but several VCs that come together in a syndicate to finance a venture.In this chapter, we therefore argue for an expansion of the standard perspective to also include frictions within VC syndicates.Put differently, what are the frictions that arise from the fact that there is not just one investor for each venture, but several investors with different incentives, objectives and cash flow rights, who nevertheless need to collaborate to help make the venture a success?We outline the ways in which these coordination frictions manifest themselves, describe the underlying drivers and document several contractual solutions used by VCs to mitigate their effects.We believe that this broader perspective provides several promising avenues for future research.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 37 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.