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Abstract We analyze early-venture fundraising from dispersed, endogenously informed investors. An entrepreneur chooses a payoff-maximizing offering, and investors communicate their information by either contributing capital or abstaining. The entrepreneur uses the information conveyed by fundraising amounts to decide whether or not to undertake a risky venture. His decision threshold hedges investors against bad projects, creating a “loser’s blessing” that encourages contributing without information. Making the offering less attractive to investors mitigates the loser’s blessing but can give rise to a winner’s curse. Both tensions reduce financing efficiency. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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