Inflation in developing countries: does central bank independence matter? New evidence based on a new data set

Jan‐Egbert Sturm · Jakob de Haan

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Global Financial Crisis and Policies

Abstract

We analyse whether central bank independence (CBI) affects inflation in developing countries. For this purpose we have constructed a new data set for the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors for a very large sample of countries, which also covers the 1990s. We find that once various control variables are included, the CBI proxy is often not significant. We also conclude that in those regressions in which the CBI proxy is significant, the coefficient of the TOR becomes significant only after high inflation countries are added to the sample.

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References

1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes 1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence 1993Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence 1997Reducing Inflation 2001Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence 1995The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence 2000New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions 1996Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries?

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2003The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy 2008INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2007Institutions, arrangements and preferences for inflation stability: Evidence and lessons from a panel data analysis 2021Cross-Country Estimates of the Degree of Fiscal Dominance and Central Bank Independence 2004Obstacles to Disinflation: What is the Role of Fiscal Expectations?

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