Under- vs over-investment: hotel firms’ value around acquisitions

Tarik Doğru

42 citations0/0 files storedInternational Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance Financial Reporting and Valuation Research

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the extent to which under- and over-investment problems affect hotel firms’ value around the time when acquisitions are announced. Design/methodology/approach Hotel firms are classified based on their financial constraints (under-investment), corporate governance mechanisms (over-investment) and organizational structures. Multivariate analyses are conducted utilizing the panel ordinary least squares regression to examine the effects of financial constraints, corporate governance mechanisms and organizational structures on acquisition returns. Findings The results show that financial constraints have a larger effect on the firm value compared to the effect of corporate governance. Also, acquisitions are viewed as over-investments in poorly governed, franchising and hotel-real estate investment trust (REIT) firms. Research limitations/implications The analyses are limited to gains from acquisitions in the hotel industry. Therefore, future studies may examine the effects of capital expenditures and cash holdings on hotel firm value. Practical implications Acquisitions could help financially constrained firms reduce informational asymmetries. Firms could expand through franchising when they are financially constrained. However, franchising firms should take restrictive actions to control managers from making acquisitions. The hotel-REIT organizational form does not seem to cause under-investment problems, and it functions as an additional corporate governance mechanism. Originality/value In addition to the C-corporation organizational structure, hotel firms extensively adopt REIT and expand through franchising, which might affect under- and over-investment problems. Nonetheless, little is known about whether capital investments create or reduce value for hotel firms. This study helps to explain how financial constraints, corporate governance mechanisms and organizational structures affect hotel firms’ value.

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References

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