Two social brains: neural mechanisms of intersubjectivity

Abstract

It is the aim of this article to present an empirically justified hypothesis about the functional roles of the two social neural systems, namely the so-called 'mirror neuron system' (MNS) and the 'mentalizing system' (MENT, also 'theory of mind network' or 'social neural network'). Both systems are recruited during cognitive processes that are either related to interaction or communication with other conspecifics, thereby constituting intersubjectivity. The hypothesis is developed in the following steps: first, the fundamental distinction that we make between persons and things is introduced; second, communication is presented as the key process that allows us to interact with others; third, the capacity to 'mentalize' or to understand the inner experience of others is emphasized as the fundamental cognitive capacity required to establish successful communication. On this background, it is proposed that MNS serves comparably early stages of social information processing related to the 'detection' of spatial or bodily signals, whereas MENT is recruited during comparably late stages of social information processing related to the 'evaluation' of emotional and psychological states of others. This hypothesis of MNS as a social detection system and MENT as a social evaluation system is illustrated by findings in the field of psychopathology. Finally, new research questions that can be derived from this hypothesis are discussed.This article is part of the themed issue 'Physiological determinants of social behaviour in animals'.

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