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The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication
9 references·0 citing·41 second hop
The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication (2017)The Streisand effect: Signaling and parti…Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models (2016)Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Fram…The S treisand effec t and censorship backfir e (2015)The S treisand effec t and ce…Image de marque et internet. Comprendre, éviter et gérer l’effet « Streisand » (2013)Image de marque et internet. …A Theory of Deception (2010)A Theory of DeceptionBehavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection (2008)Behavioral Equilibrium in Eco…Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations (2007)Revisiting games of incomplet…Cursed Equilibrium (2005)Cursed EquilibriumAnalogy-based expectation equilibrium (2004)Analogy-based expectation equ…Job Market Signaling (1973)Job Market SignalingThe Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action (1936)The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1974)The net delusion: the dark side of Internet freedom (2011)How Sudden Censorship Can Increase Access to Information (2018)How Saudi Crackdowns Fail to Silence Online Dissent (2019)Generative AI and the future of education: Ragnarök or reformation? A paradoxical perspective from management educators (2023)Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability (1973)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)A model of investor sentiment / (1997)Informational herding with model misspecification (2016)Using Models to Persuade (2020)Learning With Heterogeneous Misspecified Models: Characterization and Robustness (2021)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)An Approach to Asset Pricing Under Incomplete and Diverse Perceptions (2013)Disinformation in International Politics (2018)Lying and Deception in Games (2019)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Information, trade and common knowledge (1982)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2007)The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory (2009)Higher education as a filter (1973)Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution (1974)INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (1977)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2010)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation (2009)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)American Economic Review (2019)A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE (1955)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1981)A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation (1999)Inside rumor: A personal journey. (1991)Electronic word-of-mouth via consumer-opinion platforms: What motivates consumers to articulate themselves on the Internet? (2004)Branding in the post-internet era (2009)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995)A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games (2004)Behavioral Finance (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1973Job Market Signaling19,221 cited
  • 2005Cursed Equilibrium436 cited
  • 2004Analogy-based expectation equilibrium410 cited
  • 2016Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models207 cited
  • 2007Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations168 cited
  • 2008Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection164 cited
  • 2010A Theory of Deception95 cited
  • 2015The S treisand effec t and censorship backfir e73 cited
  • 2013Image de marque et internet. Comprendre, éviter et gérer l’effet « Streisand »9 cited

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