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ABSTRACT This study investigates whether and how a firm's real earnings management (REM) is influenced by the strength of a country's legal regime and the presence of a Big 4 auditor. In a cross‐country examination using data from 22 countries, we find that REM increases in countries with stronger legal regimes as firms switch from accrual‐based earnings management (AEM) to REM. The presence of a Big 4 auditor reduces REM (as well as AEM) and attenuates the positive relation between legal regime strength and REM. Our results suggest that higher‐quality auditors limit client firms’ use of REM, especially in countries with a strong legal regime.
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