Decisions from Experience and from Description: Beliefs and Probability Weighting

Abstract

Decisions from description typically concern risk in the literature on decision making. It is identified as a case where outcome probabilities are objectively known. \nDecisions from experience, on the other hand, represent a case of ambiguity. Here, the outcome probabilities are not known objectively but they are subjectively inferred based on observations. \nAs in many real life situations, probabilistic inference and information search are integral parts of decisions from experience. \n \nThis dissertation explores behavioral differences between decisions from experience and from description by focusing on the role of (1) probability weighting, and (2) subjective beliefs. _Chapter 2_ investigates the impact of experience on probability weighting. _Chapter 3_ points out the role of prior beliefs in accounting for decisions from experience. _Chapter 4_ introduces a non-Bayesian model of updating which accommodates common biases in probabilistic inference. _Chapter 5_ reports results of a laboratory experiment testing Prelec’s (1998) theory of probability weighting

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