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Norms in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation in Spain
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Norms in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation in Spain (2017)Norms in Bargaining: Evidence from Govern…Overconfidence in Political Behavior (2015)Overconfidence in Political B…Salience and Consumer Choice (2013)Salience and Consumer Choice“Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and Redistributive Implications * (2013)“Last-Place Aversion”: Eviden…Heuristic Thinking and Limited Attention in the Car Market (2012)Heuristic Thinking and Limite…Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence (2009)Salience and Taxation: Theory…Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence (2008)Salience and Taxation: Theory…The Economic Effects of Constitutions (2003)The Economic Effects of Const…The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives (2001)The Provision of Public Goods…Separation of Powers and Political Accountability (1997)Separation of Powers and Poli…A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information (1995)A Stochastic Model of Sequent…A Course in Game Theory (1994)A Course in Game TheoryA Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems (1991)A Spatial Bargaining Theory o…Coalitions and Cabinet Government (1990)Coalitions and Cabinet Govern…Bargaining in Legislatures (1989)Bargaining in LegislaturesIncumbent performance and electoral control (1986)Incumbent performance and ele…The control of politicians: An economic model (1973)The control of politicians: A…Book Review: Congress, The Electoral Connection. By DAVID R. MAYHEW. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974. Pp. 180. $7.95.) (1975)Congress, The Electoral Connection (1975)The Political Business Cycle (1975)Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles (1987)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Rethinking Representation (2003)Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew (1975)Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (2002)Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin (2003)Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth (2003)Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy (2009)American Economic Review (2019)A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures (1956)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions (1981)Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes * (2008)Book Reviews : The Theory of Political Coalitions. By WILLIAM S. RIKER. (New Haven: Yale Uni versity Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 300. $7.50.) (1963)The Theory of Political Coalitions. (1963)Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models (1979)Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism (1995)Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms (1996)Electoral Engineering (2004)Corruption (1993)Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions (1997)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey (2003)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS (1988)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation (1927)A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE (1955)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Does Flattening Government Improve Economic Performance? (2015)Does environmental regulation drive away inbound foreign direct investment? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China (2016)The Return to Protectionism* (2019)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders (1998)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Party Policy in Modern Democracies (2006)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)Choices, values, and frames. (1984)Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model (1991)A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality * (2014)Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows (2017)The Political Economy of Populism (2020)Do Institutions Cause Growth? (2004)The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (2008)Democracy and dictatorship revisited (2009)
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References

  • 1994A Course in Game Theory5,513 cited
  • 2009Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence2,917 cited
  • 1986Incumbent performance and electoral control2,175 cited
  • 1989Bargaining in Legislatures1,978 cited
  • 2003The Economic Effects of Constitutions1,710 cited
  • 1973The control of politicians: An economic model1,561 cited
  • 1997Separation of Powers and Political Accountability1,171 cited
  • 2013Salience and Consumer Choice918 cited
  • 2001The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives822 cited
  • 1990Coalitions and Cabinet Government448 cited
  • 2015Overconfidence in Political Behavior356 cited
  • 2012Heuristic Thinking and Limited Attention in the Car Market328 cited
  • 1995A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information305 cited
  • 2013“Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and Redistributive Implications *302 cited
  • 2008Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence288 cited
  • 1991A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems266 cited

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