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The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation
16 references·0 citing·33 second hop
The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation (2018)The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Dox…Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology (2017)Responsible Belief: A Theory …Responsible Belief (2016)Responsible BeliefEpistemic Reasons II: Basing (2016)Epistemic Reasons II: BasingBelieving against the evidence: agency and the ethics of belief (2015)Believing against the evidenc…EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY AND DOXASTIC AGENCY (2013)EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY AND …The problem of the basing relation (2012)The problem of the basing rel…Exercising Doxastic Freedom (2011)Exercising Doxastic FreedomBelieving For a Reason (2011)Believing For a ReasonDoxastic freedom (2007)Doxastic freedomBlameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism (2007)Blameworthy Belief: A Study i…Blameworthy Belief (2007)Blameworthy BeliefResponsibility for believing (2006)Responsibility for believingDoxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief (2003)Doxastic Compatibilism and th…The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification (1988)The Deontological Conception …Belief, Reason, and Inference (1986)Belief, Reason, and InferenceDeciding to believe (1973)Deciding to believeAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777)Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge (2003)The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)Opting for the Best (2019)The Mismeasure of the Self (2021)Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963)Handbook Of Mental Control (1992)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It (2018)What is Epistemic Blame? (2018)The importance of what we care about (1982)Alief in Action (and Reaction) (2008)Crime and Culpability (2009)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Theory of Knowledge (1967)Naming and Necessity (1972)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. (1987)Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (1992)Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification (2011)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)Can We Trust Trust (2000)Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique (2003)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Believing for Practical Reasons (2018)Equal treatment for belief (2018)Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment (2018)An internalist externalism (1988)Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics (2008)No Exception for Belief (2015)Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment (2020)There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame (2020)Epistemically blameworthy belief (2019)When Evidence Isn't Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-first Virtue Epistemology (2019)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1973Deciding to believe765 cited
  • 1988The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification580 cited
  • 2006Responsibility for believing440 cited
  • 2011Exercising Doxastic Freedom181 cited
  • 2017Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology177 cited
  • 2015Believing against the evidence: agency and the ethics of belief143 cited
  • 2013EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY AND DOXASTIC AGENCY136 cited
  • 2003Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief125 cited
  • 2016Responsible Belief122 cited
  • 1986Belief, Reason, and Inference108 cited
  • 2007Doxastic freedom103 cited
  • 2007Blameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism93 cited
  • 2011Believing For a Reason90 cited
  • 2012The problem of the basing relation81 cited
  • 2007Blameworthy Belief77 cited
  • 2016Epistemic Reasons II: Basing76 cited

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