this work references cited by second hopReferences
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- 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,949 cited
- 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
- 1998Pivotal Politics1,293 cited
- 1999Delegating Powers1,068 cited
- 1985A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis1,003 cited
- 1995Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures554 cited
- 1985Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB548 cited
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- 1996Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making404 cited
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- 1998Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy283 cited
- 2001Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy232 cited
- 1997Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System231 cited
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