NO KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED

Kevin Reuter · Peter Brössel

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

ABSTRACT Assertions are the centre of gravity in social epistemology. They are the vehicles we use to exchange information within scientific groups and society as a whole. It is therefore essential to determine under which conditions we are permitted to make an assertion. In this paper we argue and provide empirical evidence for the view that the norm of assertion is justified belief: truth or even knowledge are not required. Our results challenge the knowledge account advocated by, e.g. Williamson (1996), in general, and more specifically, put into question several studies conducted by Turri (2013, 2016) that support a knowledge norm of assertion. Instead, the justified belief account championed by, e.g. Douven (2006), seems to prevail.

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2015Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2000Knowledge and Its Limits 1963Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?2002Knowledge and its Limits 1987Three‐year‐olds' difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit 1996Knowing and Asserting 2007Norms of Assertion 2006Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility

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