From Revolving Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners

Abstract

Many regulatory agency employees are hired by the firms they regulate, creating a "revolving door" between the public and private sectors.We study these transitions using detailed data from the US Patent and Trademark Office.We find that patent examiners grant significantly more patents to the firms that later hire them and that leniency extends to prospective employers.Effects are strongest in years when firms are actively hiring examiners (e.g., all else equal, our estimates are attenuated during recessions).Conditional on being granted, affected patents have broader scope, as measured by claims, and lower quality, as measured by forward citations.

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