Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition

Yuichiro Kamada · Fuhito Kojima

70 citations0/0 files storedTheoretical Economics

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models Optimization and Search Problems

Abstract

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constraints and a matching problem with contracts.

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References

1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 1990Two-Sided Matching 1982Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives 2005Matching with Contracts 2005The New York City High School Match 1981Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers

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2020The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures 2019(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice

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