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Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
16 references·2 citing·31 second hop
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition (2018)Stability and strategy-proofness for matc…Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015)Efficient Matching under Dist…Effective affirmative action in school choice (2013)Effective affirmative action …Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013)Designing Random Allocation M…School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds (2011)School Choice with Controlled…The New York City High School Match (2005)The New York City High School…Matching with Contracts (2005)Matching with ContractsGames of school choice under the Boston mechanism (2005)Games of school choice under …School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)School Choice: A Mechanism De…A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications (2003)A Fixed-Point Approach to Sta…A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. (1991)A natural experiment in the o…Two-Sided Matching (1990)Two-Sided MatchingThe college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Job Matching, Coalition Forma…Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers (1981)Job Matching with Heterogeneo…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures (2020)The Limits of Incentives in E…(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (2019)(Il)legal Assignments in Scho…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions (1994)Constrained school choice (2009)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignManipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities (1957)Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching (1990)Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment (2012)American Economic Review (2019)61. Capitalism and Freedom (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)Cores of convex games (1971)The assignment game I: The core (1971)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The Boston Public School Match (2005)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)
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References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1990Two-Sided Matching1,377 cited
  • 1982Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes1,307 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 2005Matching with Contracts802 cited
  • 2005The New York City High School Match655 cited
  • 1981Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers485 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 1991A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom.342 cited
  • 2005Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism306 cited
  • 2013Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications304 cited
  • 2003A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications291 cited
  • 2011School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds283 cited
  • 2013Effective affirmative action in school choice280 cited
  • 2015

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Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications
239 cited

Cited by

  • 2020The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures69 cited
  • 2019(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice59 cited