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IX—Moral Encroachment
16 references·16 citing·26 second hopsampled
IX—Moral Encroachment (2018)IX—Moral EncroachmentProbabilistic Knowledge (2018)Probabilistic KnowledgeAssessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications (2014)Assessment Sensitivity: Relat…Assessment Sensitivity (2014)Assessment SensitivityBelief, credence, and norms (2013)Belief, credence, and normsKnowledge and Action (2008)Knowledge and ActionEpistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007)Epistemic Injustice: Power an…Epistemic Injustice (2007)Epistemic InjusticeKnowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Knowledge and Practical Inter…KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES (2005)KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIESKnowledge and Lotteries (2003)Knowledge and LotteriesKnowledge and its Limits (2002)Knowledge and its LimitsKnowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and Its LimitsKnowing and Asserting (1996)Knowing and AssertingCausal Cognition (1996)Causal CognitionContextualism and Knowledge Attributions (1992)Contextualism and Knowledge A…Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Is Justified True Belief Know…Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges and An Extension (2023)Morality of Belief II: Three …Disagreement and alienation (2023)Disagreement and alienationYou ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework (2022)You ought to have known: posi…Epistemic akrasia: No apology required (2022)Epistemic akrasia: No apology…Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement (2022)Deep Disagreement (Part 2): E…Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself* (2021)Resisting Pessimism Traps: Th…III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs (2021)III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spur…Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified (2021)Four Arguments for Denying th…Varieties of Moral Encroachment (2020)Varieties of Moral Encroachme…The relationship between belief and credence (2020)The relationship between beli…Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk (2020)Relevance and risk: How the r…IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility (2020)IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unify…Can Pragmatists Be Moderate? (2020)Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Belief, credence, and moral encroachment (2020)Belief, credence, and moral e…Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind (2019)Moral encroachment and reason…How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment (2019)How Belief-Credence Dualism E…Linguistics in Philosophy (1967)Speech Acts (1969)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Epistemic Luck (2005)Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)WHAT THE TORTOISE SAID TO ACHILLES (1895)Vagueness, truth and logic (1975)The weirdest people in the world? (2010)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective (1988)The Epistemology of Resistance (2013)Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing (2011)Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions (2012)Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression (2014)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Very Improbable Knowing (2014)The Knower and the Known: The Nature of Knowledge in Research on Teaching (1994)Why ‘What Works’ Still Won’t Work: From Evidence-Based Education to Value-Based Education (2010)Looking for Information: A Survey of Research on Information Seeking, Needs, and Behavior (2016)What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? (2004)The Nature and Value of Knowledge (2010)Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons (1999)Learning from Words (2008)Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism (2007)Grounding in the image of causation (2015)
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References

  • 2007Epistemic Injustice9,119 cited
  • 2000Knowledge and Its Limits5,056 cited
  • 2007Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing3,800 cited
  • 1963Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?3,234 cited
  • 2002Knowledge and its Limits2,789 cited
  • 2005Knowledge and Practical Interests1,656 cited
  • 2003Knowledge and Lotteries1,316 cited
  • 2005KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES1,281 cited
  • 1992Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions1,095 cited
  • 2008Knowledge and Action690 cited
  • 2014Assessment Sensitivity683 cited
  • 1996Knowing and Asserting602 cited
  • 2014Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications597 cited
  • 1996Causal Cognition582 cited
  • 2018Probabilistic Knowledge446 cited
  • 2013Belief, credence, and norms384 cited

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  • 2020Varieties of Moral Encroachment162 cited

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2020
The relationship between belief and credence
147 cited
  • 2019How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment85 cited
  • 2020Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?77 cited
  • 2020Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk59 cited
  • 2021Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified56 cited
  • 2019Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind50 cited
  • 2023Disagreement and alienation48 cited
  • 2021Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*47 cited
  • 2022Epistemic akrasia: No apology required38 cited
  • 2020Belief, credence, and moral encroachment37 cited
  • 2022You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework36 cited
  • 2020IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility30 cited
  • 2021III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs26 cited
  • 2022Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement26 cited
  • 2023Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges and An Extension25 cited