Cognitive Consistency Theory in Social Psychology: A Paradigm Reconsidered

Abstract

From the 1950s onward, psychologists have generally assumed that people possess a general need for cognitive consistency, whose frustration by an inconsistency elicits negative affect. We offer a novel perspective on this issue by introducing the distinction between epistemic and motivational impact of consistent and inconsistent cognitions. The epistemic aspect is represented by the updated expectancy of the outcome addressed in such cognitions. The motivational aspect stems from value (desirability) of that outcome. We show that neither the outcome’s value nor its updated expectancy is systematically related to cognitive consistency or inconsistency. Consequently, we question consistency’s role in the driving of affective responses and the related presumption of a universal human need for cognitive consistency.

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