Counterpossibles in semantics and metaphysics

Timothy L. Williamson

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Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

This paper defends from recent objections and misunderstandings the orthodox view that subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents are true. It explains apparent counterexamples as cases where a normally reliable suppositional heuristic for assessing conditionals gives incorrect results, which some theorists take at face value.

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References

1972Naming and Necessity 2007The Philosophy of Philosophy 1994Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture 1962The Development of Logic 1976Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities 1980Two notions of necessity 1982Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.2012Modals and Conditionals

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2024Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy 2021Counterpossibles 2018Essence and modal knowledge 2022Mathematics and Metaphilosophy

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