Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

Abstract

Philosophy is notorious for its disagreements. Give two philosophers the same premises and we are not surprised that they disagree over the conclusion they think follows from them. Give them the same conclusion and we expect them to disagree about the correct premises. My remarks in this essay fall mainly in this latter category. Peter Singer and I both agree that we have a moral obligation to be vegetarians. This is our common conclusion. We do not agree concerning why we have this obligation. Important differences exist between us regarding the premises from which this conclusion should be derived. 1 My position implies both that (a) the idea of animal rights is intelligible 2 and also that (b) the view that certain animals have certain rights must play a role in adequately grounding the obligation to be 292 vegetarian. I shall have more to say about my position in the second section of this essay. To begin I shall note that Singer, for his part, might accept (a); that is, he might accept the view that the idea of animal rights is at least logically coherent. Clearly, however, he does not accept (b).

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