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A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?
16 references·1 citing·29 second hop
A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality? (2019)A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrational…Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12 (2017)Oxford Studies in Metaethics …Choosing Normative Concepts (2017)Choosing Normative ConceptsThe moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism (2014)The moral fixed points: new d…Being Realistic about Reasons (2014)Being Realistic about ReasonsTaking morality seriously: a defense of robust realism (2012)Taking morality seriously: a …Taking Morality Seriously (2011)Taking Morality SeriouslyOn What Matters (2011)On What MattersThinking How to Live (2008)Thinking How to LiveRobust Ethical Realism,Non-Naturalism, and Normativity (2008)Robust Ethical Realism,Non-Na…The Normative Web (2007)The Normative WebMoral realism: a defence (2004)Moral realism: a defenceMoral Realism (2003)Moral RealismConceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms (2001)Conceptual Role Semantics for…From Metaphysics to Ethics (2000)From Metaphysics to EthicsThe Authority of Reason (1998)The Authority of ReasonRuling Passions (1998)Ruling PassionsPragmatist Quietism (2022)Pragmatist QuietismAn Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987)Justification without Awareness (2006)What Is Disinformation? (2015)Mind, Language and Reality (1975)The Sources of Normativity (1996)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action (2006)The Nature of Normativity (2007)Real Definition (2015)There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes (2017)Fittingness First (2016)Learning to Make a Difference (2020)Morality and Mathematics (2020)Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason) (2015)Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy (2015)The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles (2018)Meta‐Ethics and The Problem of Creeping Minimalism (2004)THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (2007)A puzzle about epistemic akrasia (2012)Dynamics of Epistemic Modality (2013)Uniqueness and Metaepistemology (2016)Natural Moralities (2006)Appearances of the Good (2007)Conceptual Ethics I (2013)The Grammar of Decoupling: A Cognitive-Linguistic Perspective on Firms’ Sustainability Claims and Stakeholders’ Interpretation (2015)God, Locke, and Equality (2002)A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value (2005)Simulating Minds (2006)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1998Ruling Passions1,216 cited
  • 2014Being Realistic about Reasons1,095 cited
  • 2003Moral Realism980 cited
  • 2011Taking Morality Seriously929 cited
  • 2000From Metaphysics to Ethics603 cited
  • 2008Thinking How to Live517 cited
  • 2004Moral realism: a defence490 cited
  • 2012Taking morality seriously: a defense of robust realism432 cited
  • 1998The Authority of Reason413 cited
  • 2017Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12378 cited
  • 2017Choosing Normative Concepts374 cited
  • 2014The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism270 cited
  • 2001Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms251 cited
  • 2007The Normative Web244 cited
  • 2011On What Matters216 cited
  • 2008Robust Ethical Realism,Non-Naturalism, and Normativity215 cited

Cited by

  • 2022Pragmatist Quietism28 cited

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