Weak Approachability

Nicolas Vieille

54 citations0/0 files storedMathematics of Operations Research

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Guidance and Control Systems

Abstract

In this paper, we study repeated games with vector payoffs. Following Blackwell [2], we define weak approachability and its dual property, weak excludability. We use results from differential games with fixed duration to prove that every set is either weakly approachable or weakly excludable.

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References

1956An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs 1961The convergence problem for differential games

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2003Approachability in infinite dimensional spaces 2014Approachability, regret and calibration: Implications and equivalences

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