HOW TO SOLVE THE PUZZLE OF PEER DISAGREEMENT

Michele Palmira

35 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Philosophical Quarterly

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

Abstract While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage in a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the peers are permitted to do so while entertaining a sui generis doxastic attitude of hypothesis.

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2007Reflection and Disagreement 2014Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat 2010Higher‐Order Evidence 1 2011Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism 2015Why Suspend Judging?2013Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment 2013Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief*2010The Moral Evil Demons

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