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Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences
5 references·6 citing·43 second hop
Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences (2019)Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly…Nothing at Stake in Knowledge* (2017)Nothing at Stake in Knowledge*ON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS: FAILURE OF REPLICATION (2014)ON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC …Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs (2013)Lay denial of knowledge for j…Linguistic and metalinguistic intuitions in the philosophy of language (2009)Linguistic and metalinguistic…Semantics, cross-cultural style (2003)Semantics, cross-cultural sty…Difference and Robustness in the Patterns of Philosophical Intuition Across Demographic Groups (2023)Difference and Robustness in …A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind (2023)A co-citation analysis of cro…Why Variation Matters to Philosophy (2022)Why Variation Matters to Phil…Explaining Human Diversity: the Need to Balance Fit and Complexity (2021)Explaining Human Diversity: t…Experimental philosophy on time (2021)Experimental philosophy on ti…Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics (2020)Expert or Esoteric? Philosoph…Knowledge and the Flow of Information. (1983)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases (2002)Gettier Across Cultures 1 (2015)NO CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE GETTIER CAR CASE INTUITION: A REPLICATION STUDY OF WEINBERG ET AL . 2001 (2015)Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios (2025)Why Most Published Research Findings Are False (2005)Why Most Published Research Findings Are False (2005)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)Armchair‐Friendly Experimental Philosophy (2016)Is our naïve theory of time dynamical? (2019)Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology (2020)How to Define Theoretical Terms (1970)The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches (2007)THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (2007)The meaning of ‘meaning’ (2010)Reference and Proper Names: A Theory of N‐Movement in Syntax and Logical Form, 1994 (2013)Naming and Necessity (1972)The Causal Theory of Names (1973)Précis of The Origin of Concepts (2011)Whither Experimental Semantics? (2012)The inherence heuristic: An intuitive means of making sense of the world, and a potential precursor to psychological essentialism (2014)Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions (1992)Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions (2001)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia (2017)Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy (2018)Demographic Differences in Philosophical Intuition: a Reply to Joshua Knobe (2022)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years; A Scheme (1970)Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate (1992)Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test (2022)The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I (1964)The weirdest people in the world? (2010)WEIRD languages have misled us, too [Comment on Henrich et al.] (2010)The contemporary theory of metaphor (1993)Philosophy in the flesh (1999)Metaphoric structuring: understanding time through spatial metaphors (2000)“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2005)Philosophy without Intuitions (2012)Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making (2005)Generics: Cognition and Acquisition (2007)Cause and Norm (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2003Semantics, cross-cultural style711 cited
  • 2013Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs275 cited
  • 2009Linguistic and metalinguistic intuitions in the philosophy of language154 cited
  • 2017Nothing at Stake in Knowledge*104 cited
  • 2014ON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS: FAILURE OF REPLICATION102 cited

Cited by

  • 2020Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics34 cited
  • 2023Difference and Robustness in the Patterns of Philosophical Intuition Across Demographic Groups33 cited
  • 2022Why Variation Matters to Philosophy23 cited
  • 2021Experimental philosophy on time22 cited
  • 2021Explaining Human Diversity: the Need to Balance Fit and Complexity14 cited
  • 2023A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind8 cited

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