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Currie's expansive, practice-grounded account of how historical scientists "make their own [epistemic] luck" is a pivotal reset for philosophy of the historical sciences.I particularly welcome his arguments against the various forms of epistemic atomism that have inclined philosophers to an overstated pessimism about the epistemic status of fields whose subject domain is the past.Nonetheless I argue that there is more continuity between the evidenceconstituting strategies recognized by trace-centric theorists and the non-trace, "surrogative" streams of evidence to which Currie draws attention.
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