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Learning and value change
16 references·2 citing·42 second hop
Learning and value change (2019)Learning and value changeEpistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief (2017)Epistemic Utility Theory and …Conditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)Conditionalization Does Not (…An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence (2016)An Accuracy Based Approach to…Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)Accuracy and the Laws of Cred…Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities* (2015)Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learn…Rational Probabilistic Incoherence (2013)Rational Probabilistic Incohe…Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)Epistemic Teleology and the S…Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules (2009)Probabilistic Coherence and P…Arguments for–or against–Probabilism? (2008)Arguments for–or against–Prob…Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief (2008)Accuracy and Coherence: Prosp…Rational Credence and the Value of Truth (2007)Rational Credence and the Val…Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility (2006)Justifying Conditionalization…Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Knowledge and its LimitsA Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of…The toxin puzzle (1983)The toxin puzzleThe Logic of Decision (1965)The Logic of DecisionMary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles (2021)Mary Shepherd on the role of …Updating for externalists (2019)Updating for externalistsMinnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)CHAPMAN AND HALL (1985)Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference (2014)Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)The relationship between belief and credence (2020)Linguistics in Philosophy (1967)Speech Acts (1969)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Epistemic Luck (2005)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy. (1907)A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance (1980)Laws and symmetry (1989)An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism (2020)The Epistemic Threat of Deepfakes (2020)A theory of justice original editionModern Moral Philosophy (1958)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)The Aptness of Anger (2017)There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes (2017)Reasons First (2021)Probability and Evidence. (1973)Betting on Theories (1993)An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy (2010)An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy (2010)Rational Decisions (1952)Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations (1971)Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation (2007)A NEW EPISTEMIC UTILITY ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE (2013)Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters (2016)An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization (2018)The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)The Possibility of Practical Reason (1996)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)BELIEF IS CREDENCE ONE (IN CONTEXT) (2013)Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach (1990)Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (2004)On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability. (2008)Evolution of the Social Contract (2014)Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction (2003)Self to Self: Selected Essays (2020)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2002Knowledge and its Limits2,789 cited
  • 1965The Logic of Decision1,270 cited
  • 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism774 cited
  • 2016Accuracy and the Laws of Credence474 cited
  • 2006Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility385 cited
  • 1983The toxin puzzle368 cited
  • 2013Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions336 cited
  • 2008Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief332 cited
  • 2015Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities*180 cited
  • 2009Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules157 cited
  • 2008Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?126 cited
  • 2013Rational Probabilistic Incoherence112 cited
  • 2016An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence110 cited
  • 2017Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief95 cited
  • 2007Rational Credence and the Value of Truth93 cited
  • 2017Conditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy87 cited

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Cited by

  • 2019Updating for externalists35 cited
  • 2021Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles29 cited