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Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
16 references·0 citing·41 second hopsampled
Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing (2019)Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pr…Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2019)Proceedings of the 2019 ACM C…The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation (2017)The menu-size complexity of r…Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality (2017)Simple mechanisms for subaddi…Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers (2017)Posted Price Mechanisms for a…Reverse Mechanism Design (2015)Reverse Mechanism DesignOn the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms (2015)On the Complexity of Optimal …The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design (2014)The Complexity of Optimal Mec…Regret Minimization for Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions (2014)Regret Minimization for Reser…A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)A Simple and Approximately Op…The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions (2013)The Simple Economics of Appro…The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design (2012)The power of randomness in Ba…Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (2012)Approximate revenue maximizat…Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Multi-parameter mechanism des…Posted prices vs. negotiations (2008)Posted prices vs. negotiationsAlgorithmic pricing via virtual valuations (2007)Algorithmic pricing via virtu…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignIroning, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)Algorithmic Game Theory (2007)Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing (2011)Revenue maximization for query pricing (2019)A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2020)Finite-time Analysis of the Multiarmed Bandit Problem (2002)Prediction, Learning, and Games (2006)Revenue Optimization with Approximate Bid Predictions (2017)Dispersion for Data-Driven Algorithm Design, Online Learning, and Private Optimization (2018)Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions (2018)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Combinatorial Auctions (2005)An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms (2012)Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)Simple versus optimal mechanisms (2009)Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination (2013)The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly (2007)Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions (2014)Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation (2016)Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency (1999)Pricing lotteries (2014)Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (1999)Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (2000)Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search (2018)Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms (2020)On Policies for Single-Leg Revenue Management with Limited Demand Information (2020)Auctions Versus Negotiations (1996)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)The menu-size complexity of auctions (2013)Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (2017)Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity (2015)Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics (2023)
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References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2010Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing447 cited
  • 2007Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations266 cited
  • 2014A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer150 cited
  • 2017Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality104 cited
  • 2017Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers99 cited
  • 2014Regret Minimization for Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions97 cited
  • 2012The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design94 cited
  • 2014The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design89 cited
  • 2012Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items85 cited
  • 2019Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation78 cited
  • 2013The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions60 cited
  • 2008Posted prices vs. negotiations58 cited
  • 2017The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation44 cited
  • 2015Reverse Mechanism Design42 cited
  • 2015On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms

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