A Framework for Approval-Based Budgeting Methods

Nimrod Talmon · Piotr Faliszewski

54 citations0/0 files storedProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization

Abstract

We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.

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References

2004Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to participatory democracy 1983Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule 2014Properties of multiwinner voting rules 2011Budgeted social choice: from consensus to personalized decision making 2007On the complexity of achieving proportional representation 2010Handbook on Approval Voting 2017Subset Selection Via Implicit Utilitarian Voting 2018Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods

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2020Voting to select projects in participatory budgeting

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