SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Ardent realism without referential normativity
16 references·2 citing·39 second hop
Ardent realism without referential normativity (2019)Ardent realism without referential normat…Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (2020)Conceptual Engineering and Co…Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter (2018)Skepticism About Ought Simpli…Authoritatively Normative Concepts (2018)Authoritatively Normative Con…Choosing Normative Concepts (2017)Choosing Normative ConceptsBeing Realistic about Reasons (2014)Being Realistic about ReasonsWriting the Book of the World (2011)Writing the Book of the WorldTaking Morality Seriously (2011)Taking Morality SeriouslyThe meaning of ‘meaning’ (2010)The meaning of ‘meaning’Recent Work on Normativity (2010)Recent Work on NormativityAgainst quietist normative realism (2010)Against quietist normative re…The Nature of Normativity (2007)The Nature of NormativitySlaves of the Passions (2007)Slaves of the PassionsDeflationary Normative Pluralism (2007)Deflationary Normative Plural…Moral discourse and practice (1997)Moral discourse and practiceThe Sources of Normativity (1996)The Sources of NormativityTROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED (1992)TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL S…Reality and Morality (2020)Reality and MoralityNormative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity (2019)Normative roles, conceptual v…A theory of justice original editionAn Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2001)Reflection and Disagreement (2007)How We Get Along (2009)Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence (2010)Language, Truth, and Logic. (1938)Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (1989)Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege (2006)Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument (2006)REPLY TO COPP: NATURALISM, NORMATIVITY, AND THE VARIETIES OF REALISM WORTH WORRYING ABOUT (2008)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (2002)Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business (2003)Toward a Psychology of Human Agency (2006)Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980)Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1991)Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color (1991)Conceptual Innovation, Function First (2019)The Practical Origins of Ideas (2021)Conceptual engineering: A road map to practice (2022)The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism (2014)Real Definition (2015)There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes (2017)Minds, brains, and programs (1980)On a confusion about a function of consciousness (1995)Indexical order and the dialectics of sociolinguistic life (2003)Conceptual Ethics I (2013)The Grammar of Decoupling: A Cognitive-Linguistic Perspective on Firms’ Sustainability Claims and Stakeholders’ Interpretation (2015)Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy (2015)Realism and the Absence of Value (2018)Morality and Mathematics (2020)Being For (2008)A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being (2013)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)Against Grounding Necessitarianism (2014)No Work for a Theory of Grounding (2014)Grounding in the image of causation (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1996The Sources of Normativity4,116 cited
  • 2010The meaning of ‘meaning’3,767 cited
  • 2011Writing the Book of the World1,549 cited
  • 2014Being Realistic about Reasons1,095 cited
  • 2011Taking Morality Seriously929 cited
  • 2007Slaves of the Passions717 cited
  • 2007The Nature of Normativity701 cited
  • 2020Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics482 cited
  • 2017Choosing Normative Concepts374 cited
  • 1992TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED267 cited
  • 1997Moral discourse and practice218 cited
  • 2010Against quietist normative realism211 cited
  • 2018Authoritatively Normative Concepts150 cited
  • 2007Deflationary Normative Pluralism105 cited
  • 2018Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter81 cited
  • 2010Recent Work on Normativity62 cited

Cited by

  • 2020Reality and Morality37 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

  • 2019Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity27 cited