Relationship between governance mechanisms and contract performance

Dayashankar Maurya · Amit Kumar Srivastava

11 citations0/0 files storedInternational Journal of Productivity and Performance Management

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management Quality and Supply Management Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explain the variation in the relationship between governance mechanisms and the effect of the relationship on contract performance, especially in controlling partner opportunism. Design/methodology/approach This study conducts a comparative case analysis of contract governance of “National Health Insurance Program” in India. The data are collected using field research through in-depth interviews and direct observation across three states in India. Findings The authors find that the governance mechanisms continue to complement and substitute, both in a dynamic manner, but until aligned with the nature of transaction, they are ineffective to mitigate opportunism, a critical dimension of contract performance. Inappropriate governance mechanisms inflate the gaps in incomplete contracts, resulting in partner opportunism. Research limitations/implications The study draws findings from healthcare context and service-based contracting; therefore, the applicability of this study may vary in other contexts. Practical implications The paper highlights the need for building flexibility in the governance structure while designing contracts. Further, managers need to combine both governance mechanisms dynamically to align with the nature of the transaction to control partner opportunism. Originality/value The authors contribute to the existing debate on the conundrum of the relationship between governance mechanisms and provide a new explanation. The authors propose that it is not the specific governance mechanisms but the alignment of the governance mix with the nature of the transaction that determines the contract performance, especially control of partner opportunism.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 11 citations exist upstream.

References

2000The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead 2002Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?1994Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels 2008What passes as a rigorous case study?1996Interdependency, Contracting, and Relational Behavior in Marketing Channels 2003Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public‐Private Partnerships 2014Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta‐analytic investigation 2006Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.