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This paper introduces the economic concept of asymmetrical information in markets and the role of “certification” of quality in response to this condition of unequal access to information. By using this concept, art historians can advance their insight into both the historical and contemporary American art market. Understanding the importance of certification in markets recasts art institutions and professional art historians not just as neutral observers, but as potentially active market participants. Three examples of certifications are addressed: prizes granted at prestigious annual exhibitions, praise or criticism by notable art critics, and solo exhibitions at major art museums. Over time, these certifications have functioned in the market as indicators of the value of artists’ work.
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Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 4 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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