Research on Travel Mode Choice Behaviors Based on Evolutionary Game Model Considering the Indifference Threshold

Abstract

In order to improve the mode share of public transportation, an evolutionary game model based on the indifference threshold is established to analyze the travelers' mode choice behavior. The model supposes that the travelers' behavioral adjustment of decision-making of travelers follows the principle of random utility maximization only when the perceived difference in utility between modes is greater than the indifference threshold; otherwise, travelers choose randomly. A transportation network that includes private and public transportation is presented as an example to show how travelers adjust their mode choice when traffic management policy is changed. We divided the travelers into three categories based on the online survey data: high sensitivity, neutral sensitivity and low sensitivity to cost difference. The results show that, the proposed Δ-logit evolutionary game model has a unique stable equilibrium point and the point is the choice probability of the Δ-logit stochastic user equilibrium. Moreover, compared with the logit evolutionary game model, the Δ-logit evolutionary game model can predict the implementation effect of traffic policy and the time it takes for the traffic system to stabilize more accurately. In addition, the degree of sensitivity of travelers to cost difference affect the implementation effect of the policy.

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