A Separation-of-Powers Model of U.S. Chief Justice Opinion Assignment

Abstract

I examine the quintessential member of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, in the context of the separation of powers (SOP). As the leader and public face of the Court, the chief is more likely than his colleagues to be cognizant of the institution's legitimacy. Chiefs also hold the important procedural power of assigning opinions when they are in the majority. Given these conditions, I argue that the SOP constrains chief justices’ opinion assignment decisions. Specifically, I find that chief justices are significantly less likely to assign opinions to their ideological allies when the Court faces increased institutional constraint or heightened public discontent. However, these SOP effects are conditioned on the decision authority of the case – they are only constraints in statutory cases. By linking the Court’s external strategic game (SOP) to its internal strategic game, this finding adds nuance of conditionality to the legitimacy-maintenance behavior of the Court and furthers scholars’ understanding of the goals and constraints that affect chief justices’ opinion assignment decisions.

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