Values in science: assessing the case for mixed claims

Abstract

Social and medical scientists frequently produce empirical generalizations that involve concepts partly defined by value judgments. These generalizations, which have been called ‘mixed claims’, raise interesting questions. Does the presence of them in science imply that science is value-laden? Is the value-ladenness of mixed claims special compared to other kinds of value-ladenness of science? Do we lose epistemically if we reformulate these claims as conditional statements? And if we want to allow mixed claims in science, do we need a new account of how to reconcile values with objectivity? Alexandrova (2017 Alexandrova, A. 2017. A Philosophy of the Science of Well-Being. New York: OUP.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]. A Philosophy of the Science of Well-being. New York: OUP, 2018 Alexandrova, A. 2018. “Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2): 421–445.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2): 421–445) offers affirmative answers to these questions. In responding to Alexandrova’s arguments, this short discussion note motivates negative ones and in doing so casts new light on mixed claims.

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