The evolution of policy experimentation in China

Abstract

Scholars credit policy experimentation with China’s economic reforms and authoritarian resilience. This article traces the evolution of experimentation through the prism of varying motivations, such as individual career incentives, improving governance, and symbolic and factional politics. Despite the benefits, there has been a notable reduction in experimentation under Xi Jinping, creating disincentives to innovate at the local level. Nevertheless, we do find remaining pockets of policy experimentation as a result of ineffective institutional incentives, influence of peer groups, and variations in the personalities of policymakers. However, it is unclear if this is robust enough for further economic or governance reforms.

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