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Do Chinese executives reward for luck?
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Do Chinese executives reward for luck? (2020)Do Chinese executives reward for luck?Executive compensation and corporate governance in China (2011)Executive compensation and co…The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis (2009)The corporate governance less…CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts (2006)CEOs' Outside Employment Oppo…Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad (2006)Asymmetric benchmarking in co…The Limits of Financial Globalization (2005)The Limits of Financial Globa…Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects? (2004)Why Do Firms Use Incentives T…Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section (2003)Incentive Compensation When E…Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are (2001)Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? T…Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence (1999)Executive Compensation, Strat…Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance (1999)Corporate governance, chief e…The Paradox of Liquidity (1995)The Paradox of LiquidityTobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance (1994)Tobin's q, Corporate Diversif…Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory (1994)Executive Compensation and Pr…Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers (1989)Relative Performance Evaluati…Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Corporate performance and man…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityEssays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)The theory and practice of econometrics (1986)Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003)Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives (2005)Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? * (2008)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (2001)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research (2009)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms (1999)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1999)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Determinants of corporate borrowing (1977)Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach (1992)Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking (2001)Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit‐taking (2002)How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises? (2013)Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior (1989)Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? (1998)Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives (2003)The design and use of performance management systems: An extended framework for analysis (2009)CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation (2015)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment (1987)The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences (2003)Risk management, corporate governance, and bank performance in the financial crisis (2011)The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks Perform Better? (2011)Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide (2012)Executive board composition and bank risk taking (2013)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Law and Finance (1998)Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts (2006)Bank ownership and efficiency in China: What will happen in the world’s largest nation? (2007)Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation (2008)
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References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance4,334 cited
  • 1994Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance2,437 cited
  • 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration1,756 cited
  • 2001Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are1,740 cited
  • 2005The Limits of Financial Globalization1,039 cited
  • 1995The Paradox of Liquidity1,009 cited
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  • 1999Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence734 cited
  • 2004Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?615 cited
  • 1994Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory610 cited
  • 2011Executive compensation and corporate governance in China594 cited
  • 2006Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad480 cited
  • 2006CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts

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463 cited
  • 2003Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section295 cited
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