Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology

Abstract

Ideology is a central construct in political psychology. Even so, the field's strong claims about an ideological public rarely engage evidence of enormous individual differences: a minority with real ideological coherence and weak to nonexistent political belief organization for everyone else. Here, I bridge disciplinary gaps by showing the limits of mass political ideology with several popular measures and components—self‐identification, core political values (egalitarian and traditionalism's resistance to change), and policy indices—in representative U.S. surveys across four decades (Ns ~ 13 k–37 k), plus panel data testing stability. Results show polar, coherent, stable, and potent ideological orientations only among the most knowledgeable 20–30% of citizens. That heterogeneity means full‐sample tests overstate ideology for most people but understate it for knowledgeable citizens. Whether through top‐down opinion leadership or bottom‐up ideological reasoning, organized political belief systems require political attention and understanding to form. Finally, I show that convenience samples make trouble for ideology generalizations. I conclude by proposing analytic best practices to help avoid overclaiming ideology in the public. Taken together, what first looks like strong and broad ideology is actually ideological innocence for most and meaningful ideology for a few.

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