Articlebronze2018

Old and Young Politicians

Alberto Alesina · Traviss Cassidy · Ugo antonio Troiano

90 citations0/0 files storedEconomica

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Electoral Systems and Political Participation Local Government Finance and Decentralization

Abstract

We consider the role of a politician's age in Italian municipal governments. When the term limit is not binding, younger mayors engage in political budget cycles more often than older mayors. Thus younger politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, probably because they expect to have a longer political career and stronger career concerns. We discuss and rule out several alternative interpretations.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 90 citations exist upstream.

References

1991Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations 1998Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models 1995Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models 1981Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects 1975The Political Business Cycle 2004Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India 1987Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles 1988Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles

Cited by

2020Gerontocracy in a comparative perspective: Explaining why political leaders are (almost always) older than their constituents

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.