Information load in escalation situations: combustive agent or counteractive measure?

Abstract

Abstract This experimental study analyzes how a key factor, information load, influences decision making in escalation situations, i.e., in situations in which decision makers reinvest further resources in a losing course of action, even when accounting information indicates that the project is performing poorly and should be discontinued. This study synthesizes prior escalation research with information overload and investigates how different levels of information load influence the escalation of commitment. Our findings reveal a U-shaped effect of information load: When decision makers face negative feedback, a higher information load mitigates the escalation tendency up to a certain point. However, beyond this point, more information reinforces the escalation tendency. Moreover, we find that the type of feedback affects self-justification, and we find a negative and significant interaction between information load and self-justification in negative-feedback cases. Thus, studies investigating escalation of commitment should control for self-justification and information load when utilizing high levels of information load. Finally, in the positive-feedback condition, higher information load encourages decision makers to continue promising courses of action, i.e., increases decision-making performance.

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