Unintended responses to IT‐enabled monitoring: The case of the electronic logging device mandate

Abstract

Abstract Research shows that electronic monitoring technologies can reduce illicit agent (e.g., frontline worker) behavior along monitored dimensions such that principals (e.g., firms) benefit. Drawing on theory from criminology regarding the concept of offense displacement, we explain why the benefits from increased monitoring may be mitigated if agents subsequently increase other types of illicit acts not subject to greater monitoring. We investigate this possibility by examining how a mandate requiring millions of truck drivers to adopt electronic logging devices to record their working hours affected different safety behaviors and outcomes. Using data from millions of driver inspections and crash counts before and after the mandate and a differences‐in‐differences identification strategy, we find greater monitoring due to the mandate achieved its first‐order effect of reducing the frequency that drivers were in non‐compliance with work hour rules (the monitored dimension). However, drivers for small firms that were most affected by the mandate also appear to have increased their frequency of unsafe driving (e.g., speeding). We also find that crash counts for small firms did not fall relative to large firms, and may have increased. These results call into question whether increased electronic monitoring has improved safety in this industry.

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