An auction market for journal articles

Jens Prüfer · David Zetland

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Publishing and Scholarly Communication scientometrics and bibliometrics research Academic Publishing and Open Access

Abstract

We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The “academic dollar” proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article—facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.

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1967THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS, MONOPOLIES, AND THEFT 2005Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents 2002Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet 2006Repeated Games and Reputations 2003Rankings of Academic Journals and Institutions in Economics 2000The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process 1981Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding 2005How Much Better Are the Most-Prestigious Journals? The Statistics of Academic Publication

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