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The Hardest Paradox for Closure
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this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1988Two modellings for theory change703 cited
  • 2012Justification and the Truth-Connection530 cited
  • 1970Henry E. KyburgJr. , Probability and the logic of rational belief. Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Conn., 1961, x + 350 pp.525 cited
  • 2004Putting Logic in its Place469 cited
  • 2007Without Justification415 cited
  • 2005Oxford Studies In Epistemology400 cited
  • 2000The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality327 cited
  • 1990Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?255 cited
  • 2012The Laws of Belief215 cited
  • 2010What Else Justification Could Be1175 cited
  • 2011The Normative Role of Knowledge131 cited
  • 1996The epistemic virtues of consistency126 cited
  • 2016Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief113 cited
  • 2015Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence112 cited
  • 2002A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability86 cited
  • 2011The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility67 cited

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