Changing the logic of replication: A case from infant studies

Abstract

Among infant researchers there is growing concern regarding the widespread practice of undertaking studies that have small sample sizes and employ tests with low statistical power (to detect a wide range of possible effects). For many researchers, issues of confidence may be partially resolved by relying on replications. Here, we bring further evidence that the classical logic of confirmation, according to which the result of a replication study confirms the original finding when it reaches statistical significance, could be usefully abandoned. With real examples taken from the infant literature and Monte Carlo simulations, we show that a very wide range of possible replication results would in a formal statistical sense constitute confirmation as they can be explained simply due to sampling error. Thus, often no useful conclusion can be derived from a single or small number of replication studies. We suggest that, in order to accumulate and generate new knowledge, the dichotomous view of replication as confirmatory/disconfirmatory can be replaced by an approach that emphasizes the estimation of effect sizes via meta-analysis. Moreover, we discuss possible solutions for reducing problems affecting the validity of conclusions drawn from meta-analyses in infant research.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 23 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.