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Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing
12 references·1 citing·34 second hop
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing (2015)Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous PricingReverse Mechanism Design (2015)Reverse Mechanism DesignOptimal competitive auctions (2014)Optimal competitive auctionsThe Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions (2013)The Simple Economics of Appro…Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap (2011)Mechanism Design via Correlat…Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing (2011)Extreme-Value Theorems for Op…Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers (2011)Bayesian Combinatorial Auctio…The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design (2010)The power of randomness in ba…Simple versus optimal mechanisms (2009)Simple versus optimal mechani…Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations (2007)Algorithmic pricing via virtu…Competitive auctions (2006)Competitive auctionsAuctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Auctions Versus NegotiationsOptimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignA Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design (2021)A Permutation-Equivariant Neu…Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design (2012)Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity (2015)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Incentives in Teams (1973)Bayesian Mechanism Design (2013)Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples (2017)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms (2012)Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization (2012)Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination (2013)The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing (1996)Prior-Independent Multi-parameter Mechanism Design (2011)Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization (2014)Extreme Value Theory : An Introduction (2006)Algorithmic Game Theory (2007)Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions (2013)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis (2008)Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)Dynamic pricing with limited supply (2012)Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers (2017)Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (2006)Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization (2012)Data market platforms (2020)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1996Auctions Versus Negotiations809 cited
  • 2009Simple versus optimal mechanisms317 cited
  • 2007Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations266 cited
  • 2006Competitive auctions191 cited
  • 2011Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap124 cited
  • 2010The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design102 cited
  • 2011Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing67 cited
  • 2011Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers64 cited
  • 2013The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions60 cited
  • 2015Reverse Mechanism Design42 cited
  • 2014Optimal competitive auctions36 cited

Cited by

  • 2021A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design29 cited

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