Public-private collaborations in emergency logistics: A framework based on logistical and game-theoretical concepts

Florian Diehlmann · Markus Lüttenberg · Lotte Verdonck · Marcus Wiens · Alexander Zienau · Frank Schultmann

74 citations0/0 files storedSafety Science

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Facility Location and Emergency Management Disaster Management and Resilience Supply Chain and Inventory Management

Abstract

Collaboration in emergency logistics can be beneficial for governmental actors when supply chains need to be set up immediately. In comparison to research on humanitarian-business partnerships, the body of literature on so-called Public–Private Emergency Collaborations (PPEC) remains scarce. Private companies are only rarely considered within research on emergency collaborations, although they serve as an important chain in the efficient supply of goods given their resources and existing communication networks. Based on this research gap, we contribute to the research field by quantitatively evaluating public–private collaboration in emergency logistics. A framework for public–private emergency collaborations is developed based on logistical and game-theoretical concepts. In addition, we characterize both public and private actors’ possible roles in emergency logistics based on literature research and real cases. Furthermore, we provide a structured overview on existing PPECs and the challenges they are confronted with. The game-theoretic PPEC model created in this paper provides more detailed information into the motivation and incentives of the partners involved in emergency collaborations. Inspired by game-theoretic accounts of conventional public–private partnerships, this model sheds light on the partners’ participation constraints (which define the scope of collaboration), the effects on the outcome if the partners’ contributions are strategic substitutes, and on reputational effects. Finally, we illustrate how a mechanism design approach can be used by the state to transform the firm’s incentives into lower levels of undersupply or deprivation.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 74 citations exist upstream.

References

1993Economics, Organization and Management.1992Game theory: analysis of conflict 2000Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity 1963Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study 2005A theory of reciprocity 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 2018Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study 2006Humanitarian aid logistics: supply chain management in high gear

Cited by

2022Fire Risk Assessment of Subway Stations Based on Combination Weighting of Game Theory and TOPSIS Method 2023Operations research approaches for improving coordination, cooperation, and collaboration in humanitarian relief chains: A framework and literature review 2022Measuring the Supply Chain Performance of the Floricultural Sector Using the SCOR Model and a Multicriteria Decision-Making Method 2022Public-Public Collaboration for Food Safety Risk Management: Essence, Modes, and Identification of Key Influencing Factors Using DANP 2023Basis for fulfilling responsibilities, behavior, and professionalism of government agencies and effectiveness in public–public collaboration for food safety risk management

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.