Non-requiring reasons

Abstract

In a classical approach, reasons for action speak in favor of an action by pro tanto requiring it: a reason is something it would be wrong (irrational, immoral, imprudent) not to follow in the absence of countervailing justification. An increasing number of theorists, however, have argued that reasons are not always in the requiring business: some reasons do not place one in any deontic jeopardy. In this chapter, we argue that discussion of this movement - which we ourselves endorse - has been hampered by conflation of two very different types of reasons that have been advanced under the rubric of non-requiring reasons. We distinguish two compatible but conceptually distinct non-requiring reasons: permissibility-conferring and commendatory reasons, outlining the core commitments and independent functions of each.

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