Corporate Governance and the Determinants of Investment

Klaus Peter Gugler · B. Burçin Yurtoğlu · Dennis C. Mueller

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance

Abstract

We use investment-cash flow regressions to show that both asymmetric-information and agency problems are more severe in Continental Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon countries leading to too little investment by firms with attractive investment opportunities and too much by those with poor investment opportunities. Legal systems, accounting standards, and ownership structure systematically affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Cash flow coefficients are largest for family-controlled firms in Europe.

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1991Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations 1984Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have 1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information 1997Legal Determinants of External Finance 1996Financial Dependence and Growth 1997Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?1987Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment 1996Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth

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